The traditional deterministic general equilibrium theory with infinitely many commodities cannot cover economies with private information constraints on the consumption sets. We bring the level of asymmetric information equilibrium theory at par with that of the deterministic one. In particular, we establish results on equilibrium existence for exchange economies with asymmetric (differential) information and with an infinite dimensional commodity space. Our new equilibrium existence theorems include, as a special case, classical results, e.g. Bewley (J. Econ. Theory, 1972, 514-540) or Mas-Colell (Econometrica, 1985, 1039-1053.
Introduction
Uncertainty was introduced in equilibrium theory by Arrow and Debreu. Both authors realized (see for example Chapter 7 of the classical treatise of Debreu, "Theory of Value" [9] ) that if the exogenous uncertainty is described by a set which denotes the states of nature of the world and agents' characteristics, i.e. preferences and initial endowments, become random (state dependent), then the classical equilibrium results on existence and optimality of the Walrasian equilibrium continue to hold. This is the so called "state contingent" model which captures the meaning of contracts (or trades) under uncertainty. However, this model doesn't allow for trades to be made under asymmetric information as agents' uncertainty is common. In a seminal paper, Radner [22] allowed, in addition to the random preferences and initial endowments, each agent to have her own private information set which was described by a partition of an exogenously given set of states of nature. In this model optimal choices reflect the private informations of the agents as net trades of an agent are measurable with respect to her private information partition, i.e. measurable with respect to the σ-algebra that her information partition generates. Furthermore, the market clearing occurs in the sense that total consumption is equal (or less than equal, which amounts to free disposal) to the total initial endowment for each state of nature. Thus, Radner [22] introduced asymmetric information in the Arrow-Debreu model.
Concerning the assumption of free disposal, Radner himself realized that this assumption may be problematic in the context of asymmetric information. 1 Indeed, as it was shown in Glycopantis, Muir, and Yannelis [13] , the free disposal assumption may destroy the incentive compatibility of the Walrasian equilibrium and thus the resulting trades (contracts) need not be incentive compatible. Also, the free disposal assumption results in allocations which are not consistent with Bayesian rationality, i.e., they may not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game. On the other hand, it is easy to construct examples of well behaved differential information economies where no Walrasian equilibrium exists with positive prices and without free disposal (see [13] ).
The main purpose of this paper is to extend the theory of differential information economies to infinite dimensional commodity spaces. In particular, we prove the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for an economy with asymmetric (differential) information. The commodity spaces treated are general enough to include most infinite dimensional spaces appearing in equilibrium theory. Moreover, we allow for very general preferences, i.e., preferences need not be transitive or complete. Furthermore, our results are established without the assumption of free disposal.
Despite the fact that infinite dimensional commodity spaces have been introduced in order to capture the meaning of uncertainty, or commodity differentiation, or of an infinite time horizon, none of the existing models with an infinite dimensional commodity space allow for asymmetric information and no free disposal simultaneously. Our results indicate that such a generalization is possible and thus we bring the level of asymmetric information equilibrium theory at par with that of the deterministic one.
However, there are several technical difficulties which need to be bypassed. In fact, the infinite dimensional standard arguments and results are not directly applicable. The reason is that the (informationally constrained) consumption sets do not coincide with the positive cone of the commodity space, and also are not upper comprehensive; rather the (informationally constrained) consumption sets are located in "thin" subspaces of the commodity space. In particular, even when the positive cone of the commodity space has non-empty interior, this is not so for the consumption sets. Moreover, for the case where the positive cone of the commodity space has an empty interior, properness assumptions on preferences and techniques like the Riesz-Kantorovich formula (see e.g. [2] ) do not work immediately when trying to follow the standard approach of obtaining an equilibrium for an economy from an equilibrium relative to the restriction of the economy to the order ideal generated by the aggregate endowment. A particular problem here is that price systems may be non-positive because we cannot make a free disposal assumption, so that some intermediate constructions and new arguments are necessary. Thus, our new equilibrium existence results not only include, as a special case, generalized versions of the classical deterministic results, e.g. Bewley [7] and Mas-Colell [18] , but also complement and extend the techniques and some results in Aliprantis, Tourky, and Yannelis [3] .
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, some notational and terminological conventions are settled. In Section 3 the model and the results are presented. Two settings will be treated. In the first one, the commodity space is an ordered Hausdorff locally convex space whose positive cone has a non-empty interior, while in the second one it is a locally convex-solid Riesz space whose positive cone may have empty interior. Actually, the equilibrium existence result of the first setting will serve as an essential tool to establish the existence result of the second setting. Section 4 contains some remarks regarding the interpretation of the model. Finally, Section 5 contains the proofs.
Notation and terminology
As usually, the term ordered vector space means a real vector space E endowed with a partial ordering ≥ (i.e. ≥ is a reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric relation) such that x ≥ y entails x + z ≥ y + z, and x ≥ 0 entails λx ≥ 0, for x, y, z ∈ E and λ ∈ R with λ > 0. We will write x ≤ y to mean y ≥ x.
Let E be an ordered vector space. We write E + for the positive cone of E, i.e. E + = {x ∈ E : x ≥ 0}. Thus E + is a convex cone satisfying E + ∩ −E + = {0}. Further, for x, y ∈ E with x ≤ y, we denote by [x, y] the order interval {z ∈ E : x ≤ z ≤ y}.
By an ordered Hausdorff locally convex space we mean an ordered vector space E endowed with a Hausdorff locally convex topology such that the positive cone E + is closed.
Recall that a Riesz space (or vector lattice) is an ordered vector space E such that for any x, y ∈ E the set {x, y} has a supremum and an infimum in E (for the ordering ≥ of E). Let E be a Riesz space. Given x, y ∈ E, the expressions x + , x − , |x|, x ∨ y, x ∧ y, and x ⊥ y have the usual meaning, and we will write L(x) for the order ideal in E generated by x. Thus, if x ∈ E + then
[−nx, nx] = {z ∈ E : |z| ≤ nx for some n ∈ N}.
An element x ≥ 0 of a Riesz space E is said to be an order unit if L(x) = E, and if E is a locally convex-solid Riesz space, then an element x ∈ E + is said to be a quasi-interior point of E + if L(x) is dense in E. (Of course, an order unit in a locally convex-solid Riesz space E is a quasi-interior point of E + . The converse does not hold in general.) When a product E Ω is involved, where Ω is a non-empty finite set and E is both an ordered vector space and a topological vector space, then E Ω is always regarded as endowed with the product topology and the product ordering. With this convention, if E is an ordered Hausdorff locally convex space, then so is E Ω , and if E is a Hausdorff locally convex-solid Riesz space, then the same is true of E Ω .
Given a topological vector space E, we denote by E * the topological dual space of E, i.e. the space of all continuous linear functions from E into R. For a product E Ω , the topological dual is denoted by E Ω, * .
Finally, for a subset A of a topological space, int A denotes the interior of A, and c A the closure of A.
The model and the results
In this section we set up the formal model considered in this paper. See the next section for remarks concerning the interpretation.
Let E be an ordered Hausdorff locally convex space, and let Ω be a non-empty finite set of states of nature. Given a partition P of Ω, we will say that an element x ∈ E Ω is P-measurable if S ∈ P and s, s ∈ S imply x(s) = x(s ).
A differential information economy E with finitely many agents and commod-
. . , n} is the finite set of agents; -for each i ∈ I, H i is the private information partition of Ω; -for each i ∈ I, the consumption set is the set
and such that -i∈I w i = 0.
(Clearly, preferences coming from expected utility are a special case of this setting.) Note that this definition implies that each consumption set X i is a closed convex cone in E Ω + .
An allocation for the economy E is a list (x i ) i∈I where x i ∈ X i for each i ∈ I. The allocation (x i ) i∈I is said to be feasible if i∈I x i = i∈I w i ; it is said to be individually rational if w i / ∈ P i (x i ) for each i ∈ I; it is said to be Pareto optimal if it is feasible and if there is no feasible allocation (x i ) i∈I with x i ∈ P i (x i ) for each i ∈ I. A quasi-equilibrium for E is a pair ((x i ) i∈I , p) where (x i ) i∈I is a feasible allocation and p ∈ E Ω, * is a price system with p = 0 such that for each i ∈ I, px i ≤ pw i and whenever y ∈ P i (x i ) then py ≥ pw i . The quasiequilibrium ((x i ) i∈I , p) will be called individually rational if the allocation (x i ) i∈I is individually rational, and it will be called non-trivial if some agents have income, i.e. if pw i > inf{py : y ∈ X i } holds for some i ∈ I. Finally, an equilibrium is a quasi-equilibrium ((x i ) i∈I , p) where y ∈ P i (x i ) actually implies py > pw i .
Note that there is no free disposal assumption embodied in the notion of feasibility and that a (quasi-) equilibrium price system is required to be continuous for the topology of E Ω . Also note that the term "Pareto optimal" must be interpreted relative to the given information structure of the economy. Finally, note that since consumption sets are convex, if the economy satisfies a suitable irreducibility condition and preferences have open upper sections-which is implied by assumption (A5) below-then every non-trivial quasi-equilibrium will in fact be an equilibrium.
We will consider the following assumptions.
(A1) For every i ∈ I and each x ∈ X i , x / ∈ P i (x) (irreflexivity). (A2) For every i ∈ I and each x ∈ X i , the set P i (x) is convex. (A3) Whenever (x i ) i∈I is a feasible and individually rational allocation, then P i (x i ) = ∅ for each i ∈ I (non-satiation of preferences at feasible and individually rational allocations). (A4) Whenever (x i ) i∈I is a Pareto optimal and individually rational allocation, then x i ∈ c P i (x i ) for each i ∈ I (local non-satiation of preferences at Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations).
For the next assumption we introduce the following notation: If η is some topology on (the set underlying) E, which may be different from the original topology of E, then η Ω denotes the corresponding product topology on E Ω .
(A5) There is a Hausdorff linear topology η on E such that all order intervals in E are η-compact and such that for each i ∈ I, P i is η Ω -"original topology of E Ω "-continuous, i.e. P i has a relatively open graph in X i ×X i for the product topology η Ω ×"original topology of E Ω ".
See below for examples of spaces for which the hypothesis on order intervals stated in this assumption is satisfied. We refer to Yannelis and Zame [25] for a discussion of formulating a continuity assumption on preferences in terms of a "mixed topology."
The next assumption will be used to get a quasi-equilibrium that is actually non-trivial.
(A6) There is a feasible allocation (x i ) i∈I such that for each i ∈ I and each s ∈ Ω, λ i∈I w i (s) ≤ x i (s) for some real number λ > 0.
The interpretation of this assumption is that there be a feasible (in particular, informationally feasible) allocation in which, in each single state, each agent gets a commodity bundle containing every commodity available in the aggregate. Note that in the finite dimensional case E = R , (A6) says exactly that there be a feasible allocation such that in each state, each agent gets a quantity > 0 of every commodity that is available in the aggregate. A similar assumption was used in Radner [22] . Observe that (A6) automatically holds in the special case of symmetric information (i.e. when the information partitions of the agents agree), and in particular if there is only one state of nature; evidently, in this case, an equal division of the aggregate endowment among the agents does the job required by (A6). In the case of asymmetric information, if the space E contains order units, e.g. if E = L ∞ (µ), one can assume that the endowment of each agent in each state is an order unit of E, and then the initial allocation itself does the job. For another example, take E = L p (T, T , µ), with 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ and µ being σ-finite. Then, viewing elements of E as (extended real valued) measures on (T, T ), one can assume that, for any two agents i and j, in each state the endowment of i has a bounded Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to that of j, and then again the initial allocation does the job as may easily be verified.
Our first existence result addresses the case where the space E is an ordered Hausdorff locally convex space whose positive cone E + has a non-empty interior. A natural assumption in this case is:
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. Let E be an ordered Hausdorff locally convex space such that E + has a non-empty interior, let Ω be a non-empty finite set of states, and let E = [(H i , P i , w i ) i∈I ] be a differential information economy with commodity space E Ω . Suppose that (A1) to (A7) hold for E. Then E has a non-trivial and individually rational quasi-equilibrium.
(See Section 5.3 for the proof.) Theorem 1 extends results of Bewley [7] and Florenzano [10] to the asymmetric information context.
Next we will address the case where E is a locally convex-solid Riesz space whose positive cone E + may have an empty interior. It is a well known fact that without some properness hypotheses on preferences, equilibrium existence may fail even in standard complete information economies when the positive cone of the commodity space has empty interior. In this paper, we will use the following properness notion, which was introduced in Aliprantis, Tourky, and Yannelis [2] under the name "v-proper," and which we will call "ATY-proper" here, the "ATY" standing for the mentioned authors.
(The original name "v-proper" in [2] was in order to indicate that for a certain element v of the commodity space, x i + v should belong to the intersection (int P i (x i )) ∩ X i . In this paper, we have no need to do so, and have therefore chosen a different name to avoid confusion.) We will assume:
(A8) Whenever (x i ) i∈I is a Pareto optimal and individually rational allocation, then P i is ATY-proper at x i for each i ∈ I.
For the following, recall from Section 2 that for an x ∈ E + , L(x) denotes the order ideal in E generated by x. The next assumption requires that the aggregate endowments in the single states do not vary too much across states.
(A9) There is an e ∈ E + such that L( i∈I w i (s)) = L(e) for each s ∈ Ω.
For spaces E which contain order units, e.g. E = R or E = L ∞ (µ), one can assume that the aggregate endowment in each state is an order unit, which implies (A9). In particular, if the interior of E + is non-empty and it is assumed that the aggregate endowment in each state is in the interior of E + then (A9) holds. We remark that at the cost of some additional burden of notation in the proofs, (A9) can be dropped from the statements of Theorems 2 and 3 below.
We will first consider the case of spaces whose positive cones have quasi-interior points. 2 A natural assumption is then:
The class of locally convex-solid Riesz spaces whose positive cones contain quasi-interior points includes, in particular, those locally convex-solid Riesz spaces which have order units. Thus it includes L ∞ (µ) when endowed with the sup-norm topology as well as when endowed with the Mackey topology τ (L ∞ (µ), L 1 (µ)). In particular, it includes ∞ with the sup-norm topology as well as with the Mackey topology τ ( ∞ , 1 ). It also includes several classical Banach lattices that have no order units, e.g. the sequence spaces c 0 and p , 1 ≤ p < ∞, as well as the Lebesgue spaces L p (µ), 1 ≤ p < ∞, when µ is σ-finite.
Note that for all these spaces there exists some linear topology η such that all order intervals are η-compact, as required in assumption (A5). In fact, for the spaces c 0 , p , and L p (µ), 1 ≤ p < ∞, the weak topology does the job, while for L ∞ (µ) and ∞ one can take the weak * topology with respect to L 1 (µ) and 1 , respectively.
Theorem 2. Let E be a Hausdorff locally convex-solid Riesz space whose positive cone contains quasi-interior points, let Ω be a non-empty finite set of states, and let E = [(H i , P i , w i ) i∈I ] be a differential information economy with commodity space E Ω . Suppose that (A1) to (A6) and (A8) to (A10) hold for E. Then E has a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium.
(See Section 5.5 for the proof.) Theorem 2 extends results of Yannelis and Zame [25] and Araujo and Monteiro [5] to asymmetric information economies (modulo that the properness assumption there is slightly different).
Finally, we address the case where assumption (A10) need not hold, and in particular the case where the positive cone of the commodity space may not contain quasi-interior points at all. An example for this latter case is the space ca(K) of bounded regular Borel measures on a compact Hausdorff space K, endowed with the total variation norm. Recall that order intervals in ca(K) are weakly compact, so that assumption (A5) is satisfiable.
Note that under (A10) and (A9), for each i ∈ I the intersection of X i with L( i∈I w i ), the order ideal in E Ω generated by the total endowment i∈I w i , is dense in X i , so that the sets P i (x i ) from the definition of ATY-properness must actually satisfy
For the general case where (A10) may not hold, we have to assume this property explicitly:
(A8') Whenever (x i ) i∈I is a Pareto optimal and individually rational allocation, then for each i ∈ I, P i is ATY-proper at x i such that the set
Similarly, we have to adjust the statements of (A3) and (A4) in the following way.
(A3') Whenever (x i ) i∈I is a feasible and individually rational allocation, then P i (x i ) ∩ L( i∈I w i ) = ∅ for each i ∈ I. (A4') Whenever (x i ) i∈I is a Pareto optimal and individually rational allocation, then x i ∈ c (P i (x i ) ∩ L( i∈I w i )) for each i ∈ I.
We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let E be a Hausdorff locally convex-solid Riesz space, let Ω be a non-empty finite set of states, and let E = [(H i , P i , w i ) i∈I ] be a differential information economy with commodity space E Ω . Suppose that (A1), (A2), (A3'), (A4'), (A5), (A6), (A8'), and (A9) hold for E. Then E has a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium.
(See Section 5.6 for the proof.) For the special case of only one state of nature, Theorem 3 reduces to a generalized version of the classical result of Mas-Colell [18] , thus extending this latter result to the asymmetric information context.
We close this section with some remarks.
Remark 1. Open problems. In the special case of symmetric information (and in particular in the case of only one state of nature), the conclusion of Theorem 2 continues to hold when the requirement of ATY-properness in the statement of assumption (A8) is replaced by the weaker properness notion that results when the equality P i (x i ) ∩ X i = P i (x i ) in the definition of ATY-properness is replaced by the inclusion P i (x i ) ∩ X i ⊂ P i (x i ). (See e.g. Theorem 1 in Podczeck [21] . 3 ) We leave it as an open question whether, in the context of Theorem 2, this weaker properness notion would also be sufficient for the case of a differential information economy.
Further, we leave it as an open question whether Theorems 2 and 3 can be generalized to cover the case where the commodity space is a vector lattice with a locally convex topology such that the topological dual space need only be a sublattice of the order dual, and not an ideal in the order dual as implied by the hypothesis that the commodity space be locally convex-solid. This latter generalization would cover e.g. the case where, in each state, the commodity space is ca(K) with a topology such that the price space becomes C(K), the space of continuous functions on K.
Interpretation of the model
On the level of interpretation, the model in the previous section is basically Radner's [22] model of equilibrium under uncertainty, specialized to the case of an exchange economy. Radner presented his model as an enhancement of Debreu's model of equilibrium with uncertainty, as introduced by Debreu in Chapter 7 of his "Theory of Value" [9] . So let us start with some remarks on this latter model (specialized to the case of an exchange economy).
Briefly (and condensed), Debreu's model can be described as follows. There is a "beginning of history" where all price formation and contract trading takes place and, in particular, all individual choices are made. From then on, all actions made by the agents are determined by the choices made at this "beginning of history." In particular, there is no revision of the strategies implied by these choices. We will refer to the "beginning of history" as "stage 1" of the model. We will use the term "stage 2" to denote the stage of the model where the contracts are executed and consumption takes place. (Actually, stage 2 may consist of many time dates, as commodities are time-dated in the Arrow-Debreu model.) At stage 1, agents are uncertain about their environment in stage 2. This uncertainty is modeled by a finite set Ω of mutually exclusive states of nature, one of these states will have been realized in stage 2. Thus un-certainty is completely resolved in stage 2. 4 (If one explicitly considers stage 2 as consisting of several time periods, one can consider a stepwise resolution of uncertainty.)
Now, in stage 1, there is a market for each commodity in each state in stage 2, i.e. agents trade contracts that specify deliveries and receipts of commodities contingent on the state that will have been realized in stage 2. It is supposed that agents have preferences over consumption bundles across states when making their choices at stage 1. It is also assumed that agents know their endowments in state 2 as a function on Ω. Thus, an equilibrium is given by a price system in stage 1 such that all markets for the state-contingent commodities in stage 2 clear. Implicit in the model, there is a "government institution" (or "intermediary" or "court") in stage 2-not to be confused with the Walrasian auctioneer in stage 1-which can verify the state that has been realized and knows the accounts of the agents (i.e. their obligations according to the contracts made in stage 1) and, based on this, can enforce that deliveries and receipts of commodities specified by a contract for the state in question are indeed carried out. Thus, there are no issues concerning execution of contracts in stage 2; in particular, there are no issues concerning any incentive compatibility problems.
Such issues could arise, of course, would one not imagine such a "government institution" behind the scene, because signing and fulfilling of contracts is not quid-pro-quo. E.g., an agent could have signed a contract in stage 1, whose fulfillment in some state s in stage 2 would lead him/her to a consumption bundle in this state which, ex-post in stage 2, is regarded by him/her as being inferior to her/his endowment in this state. Then, given that this state s has been realized, the agent has an incentive to refuse accepting that s has been realized, even though he/she knows that s is the true state, and even though he/she knows that all the other agents know that s is the true state. Thus, some legal institution is needed in stage 2 which can verify the occurrence of s. Or, to give another example, agents could have incentives to sign contracts in stage 1 which they will not be able to fulfill in stage 2, would there be no institution in stage 2 which may impose some punishment in case contracts cannot be fulfilled in this stage. In particular, it would be unclear why agent should participate in the market in stage 1 at all. Thus, some "government institution" must be assumed to be present behind the scene in stage 2 of the Debreu model if one wants to interpret an equilibrium allocation in this model as a viable outcome.
Radner [22, enhances Debreu's model by explicitly allowing that different agents may have different (private) information concerning the realizations of states of nature. To each agent i, a private information partition H i of the set Ω of states of nature is attributed. The interpretation is that given that some state s has been realized in stage 2 and belongs to some element S of H i , then the information agent i has enables her/him to determine that state s belongs to S, but not to determine which of the elements of S is actually the true state. In stage 1, each agent knows the kind of information he/she will have in stage 2, i.e. knows her/his information partition of Ω. Now according to Radner, if an agent cannot distinguish, in stage 2, between two states, then he/she cannot plan, in stage 1, to make deliveries and receipts of commodities in stage 2 contingent on these states. That is, as a function of the state of nature, contracts signed by an agent in stage 1 have to be measurable with respect to her/his information partition. (Of course, each agent may know only his/her own information partition, and not those of others).
Anything else in Radner [22, is as in Debreu [9, Chapter 7] . In particular, agents know the set Ω of states, all choices by agents are made at once in stage 1 ex ante, and there is only one budget constraint for each agent.
Radner does not deal with the question of how the economy operates in stage 2.
In particular, no process of "reporting information by agents" is conceived by Radner. Also, it is not specified by Radner what the "government institution" in stage 2 knows concerning the realization of states.
Of course, one cannot suppose that the "government institution" in stage 2 knows the true state. For would one do so, one would also have to suppose that agents, in stage 1, anticipate such knowledge of the "government." But then, trusting the enforcement capabilities of the "government" in stage 2, agents might well sign, in stage 1, contracts being not measurable with respect to their information partition, even though they may not be able by themselves to identify the true state in stage 2.
So one may ask for a story that, on the one hand, supports Radner's assertion that agents sign contracts in stage 1 that are consistent with the information they will have in stage 2 and, on the other hand, can explain how the contracts are enforced in stage 2, i.e. can explain why agents have no incentives in stage 2 not to behave according to the contracts they have signed in stage 1. In this regard, let us start with an example.
Example : There are two agents 1 and 2, two states of nature a and b, and two goods available in each state, quantities of these goods being denoted by x and y, respectively. The two states are viewed as equally probable by both agents, and preferences are formed according to expected utility. Set Ω = {a, b}. The agents' utility functions and initial endowments are given as follows:
For each i = 1, 2, define
by w 2 (a) = (10, 8) and w 2 (b) = (0, 10).
The private information sets are,
The feasible allocation below is fully Pareto optimal, where "fully" means without regard to the information constraints.
However, this allocation has the following incentive compatibility problem. If b is the realized state of nature but agent 2 reports state a-notice that agent 1 cannot distinguish state b from state a-then agent 2 becomes better off, i.e.,
Notice that the consumption bundle agent 1 gets in the allocation ( * ) is not H 1 -measurable. Therefore, the lack of private information measurability for agent 1 resulted in a non-incentive compatible allocation. This is a "mistake" that agent 1 made not to trade in an H 1 -measurable way. Indeed if agent 1 had chosen to trade in an H 1 -measurable fashion then there would be no incentive compatibility problem.
As a matter of fact, the H i -measurable allocation (i = 1, 2) below is incentive compatible and Pareto optimal relative to the informationally constrained consumption sets. (5, 5) ).
( †)
Notice that in accordance with the fact that agent 1 cannot distinguish between states a and b, his/her consumption in the allocation ( †) is the same in both states.
In view of this example, we will now state some notion of incentive compatibility. It is supposed in the following that agents' preferences are given in terms of expected utility.
For a state s ∈ Ω, we denote by S i (s) that element of agent i's information partition H i which contains s. Also, if C is any coalition of agents, we denote by i∈C H i the "meet" of the H i 's over C, i.e., the finest partition of Ω which is a subset of H i for each i ∈ C. Finally, u i denotes the utility function of agent i (defined on the positive cone of the commodity space available in each state, and taken here as state independent for simplicity).
Definition 2. A feasible allocation (x i ) i∈I is said to be CIC, for "coalitionally incentive compatible," if the following is not true: There exist a coalition C and states a, b in Ω such that
This notion of incentive compatibility requires that it be not possible for any coalition C to gain by reporting a false state to the complementary coalition I C, whose members cannot distinguish the false state from the true one.
Notice that condition (a) implies that the members of coalition C have agreed on the event S i (a) which contains the realized state of nature a. 5
If one considers only coalitions of the form C = {i} then the above notion reduces to individual incentive compatibility.
Now by a standard fact, every Walrasian equilibrium allocation with informationally measurable contracts belongs to the private core, i.e. the standard core relative to the informationally constrained consumption sets (see Yannelis [23] ). Combining this with Theorem 4.1 in Koutsougeras and Yannelis [15] shows that any such equilibrium allocation is CIC in the sense of Definition 2, provided that preferences satisfy some mild assumptions, and that feasibility of allocations is required to be exact, i.e. without free disposal.
We may now give the following interpretation of a Walrasian equilibrium with informationally measurable contracts, i.e. contracts being measurable with respect to agents' informational constraints.
In stage 2, there is some intermediary institution to which agents, based on their information given the realization of the state of nature, have to declare their entitlements (and obligations) according to the contracts made in stage 1, and to which they, at the same time, have to make the corresponding deliveries and receipts of commodities. (Thus there is no interim state of information reporting prior to the execution of contracts.) It is supposed that if the realized state s belongs to some element S of the information partition H i of an agent i, then i is able to prove (to a court) that the true state belongs to S, but is not able to prove which of the elements of S is indeed the true state. 6 Thus, if and only if agents make informationally measurable contracts in stage 1, they will always be able to prove in stage 2, on account of only their own private information, that they are entitled to what is specified by their contracts.
Should some agents misreport their information in stage 2, i.e. make wrong declarations with respect to their entitlements, and should this imply that the claims made by all the agents are not compatible (in the sense of feasibility), then an agent who has claims according to an informationally measurable contract could prove the validity of his claims to a court, and the court could figure out the agents who have not made truthful declarations, and force them to meet their obligations, and might even punish them. Thus, from the exante perspective of an agent in stage 1-where choices have to be made over lotteries-it makes sense for the agent to sign only contracts being consistent with the information he will have in stage 2, because only for such contracts he can be sure that, in any case, they can indeed be enforced to be carried out in stage 2. Note that this story works without assuming preferences to be given in terms of expected utility. 7
Now something more can be said in the expected utility framework. According to the remarks above, in this framework equilibrium allocations with informationally measurable contracts are individually incentive compatible ex-post, so agents will indeed behave ex-post according to their information, and the court would actually never have to get active (even though it has to exist behind the scene as a threat). Since informationally measurable contracts are in fact coalitionally incentive compatible, it is even true that an equilibrium with informationally measurable contracts, a non-cooperative solution, yields a coalitionally stable outcome.
For another interpretation of a Walrasian equilibrium with informationally measurable contracts see Glycopantis et al. [13] . It is shown there that such an equilibrium can be implemented as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of some extensive form game.
Proofs

Outline
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the idea of Bewley's [7] 's proof of equilibrium existence for an economy with commodity space L ∞ (µ). Recall that Bewley's approach is to consider the restrictions of the economy to the finite dimensional linear subspaces of L ∞ (µ) that contain the individual endowments. Standard results yield equilibria for these restrictions, and by a limit argument an equilibrium for the original economy is obtained.
The crucial issue in this approach is to get a price system in the limit that is indeed non-zero. In our context, difficulties arise in this regard because, due to the information constraints, consumption sets may differ across agents and, in particular, may have empty interior. Further, since there is no free disposal, (quasi-) equilibrium prices for the finite dimensional restrictions of the economy cannot be guaranteed to be positive. The main problem is to identify a suitable subnet of the net of finite dimensional linear subspaces of the commodity space, so that a limit argument producing a non-zero price system becomes possible. The central idea in our proof of Theorem 1 to deal with this problem is to work with a direct sum decomposition of some subspace containing the individual consumption sets. See Section 5.3 for the actual argument. Preliminary results implying the existence of quasi-equilibria for the restrictions of the economy to finite dimensional subspaces are provided in Section 5.2.
Now concerning Theorems 2 and 3, recall that, when the commodity space is a locally-convex solid Riesz space whose positive cone may have empty interior, one standard approach to get an equilibrium for an exchange economy roughly consists of the following steps. (1) Show that the restriction of the economy to the order ideal generated by the aggregate endowment has a quasi-equilibrium, using the fact that, when endowed with an order unit norm, (principal) order ideals have positive cones with non-empty interior. (2) Appealing to properness assumptions, construct, based on the price system obtained in step 1, personalized but continuous price systems for the single consumers which support the preferred sets at the allocation obtained in step 1. (3) Take the supremum of these personalized price systems and show that this supremum yields a quasi-equilibrium price system, using the lattice structure of the commodity space and its dual. At this step it is essential for the argument to work, that consumption sets are assumed to be equal to the positive cone of the commodity space, or at least to be upper comprehensive.
Basically, our proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 follow this approach. Steps 1 and 2 are not difficult to adjust to our context of asymmetric information; in particular, we can invoke our Theorem 1 to accomplish step 1, and a result of Podczeck [21] -see Lemma 3 in Section 5.4-to deal with step 2. However, substantial difficulties arise in step 3. Because consumption sets may lie in thin subspaces of the commodity space and may differ across agents due to asymmetric information, the supremum of the personalized prices from step 2 may not support the preferred sets of the consumers anymore. Nevertheless, by appropriately modifying the personalized prices from step 2 before considering their supremum, we are able to construct a quasi-equilibrium price system. For this, however, a lot of preparing technical work is needed, which is contained in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 contains the actual proof of Theorem 2, and Section 5.6 that of Theorem 3.
Lemmata for the proof of Theorem 1
Lemma 1. Let Γ = (X i , A i , P i ) i∈I be an abstract economy, where I is a finite set of agents, and for each i ∈ I, X i is a subset of R and both A i : j∈I X j → 2 X i and P i : j∈I X j → 2 X i are correspondences such that for each i ∈ I:
(B1) X i is a non-empty, compact, and convex subset of R .
(B2) P i is lower semi-continuous.
(B3) A i is non-empty and convex valued and has a (relatively) open graph in
For all x ∈ j∈I X i , x i does not belong to the convex hull of P i (x) (where x i denotes the ith component of x; similarly for x * i below).
Then Γ has a quasi-equilibrium, i.e. there is an x * ∈ i∈I X i such that for all i ∈ I,
Proof. With some minor modifications, the proof is that of Theorem 6.1 in Yannelis and Prabhakar [24] . For sake of completeness, we repeat the argument here. Define correspondences ϕ i : j∈I X j → 2 X i , i ∈ I, by setting ϕ i (x) = A i (x) ∩ co P i (x) where "co" stands for "convex hull." Then each ϕ i has convex values, and it is straightforward to verify that ϕ i is lower semi-continuous for each i ∈ I. Set V i = {x ∈ j∈I X j : ϕ i (x) = ∅}. By Michael [20, Theorem 3.1 ] the restriction of ϕ i to V i has a continuous selection, i.e. there is a continuous function f i :
Then each F i is upper semi-continuous and has non-empty, closed, and convex values, and the same is true of the correspondence F : i∈I X i → 2 i∈I X i given by F (x) = i∈I F i (x). By Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the correspondence F has a fixed point, and such a fixed point provides a quasi-equilibrium as may readily be seen.
be an economy with commodity space R and with a finite set I of agents where for each i ∈ I, X i is the consumption set, w i is the initial endowment, and P i : X i → 2 X i is the preference relation. Suppose the following conditions.
(C1) X i is closed and convex for each i ∈ I.
Then E has a quasi-equilibrium ((x * i ) i∈I , p * )-in particular, p * = 0-such that the allocation (x * i ) i∈I is individually rational. 8
Proof. 9 Since preferences are not assumed to be locally non-satiated, we will make use of the following construction, which goes back to Gale and Mas-Colell [12] . For each i ∈ I define a correspondence P i :
Then P i (x i ) = ∅ if and only if P i (x i ) = ∅. In particular, by (C6), if (x i ) i∈I is a feasible and individually rational allocation, then
Finally, it is plain that (C4) implies that each P i is lower semi-continuous.
For each i ∈ I, let X f i be the set of those x i ∈ X i that belong to feasible allocations. By (C1) and (C2), X f i is compact for each i ∈ I. Choose and fix a compact and convex subset K of R such that for each i ∈ I, X f i ⊂ int K and let X i = X i ∩ K. Then, by (C1) again, X i is compact and convex for each i ∈ I. Also, from (C3), w i ∈ X i ∩ int K for each i ∈ I.
Write I = {1, . . . , m} and let I = {0} ∪ I. Set X 0 = {p ∈ R : p ≤ 1} and let X = i∈I X i . We will denote elements of X by (p, x) where p ∈ X 0 and x = (
and let P 0 : X → 2 X 0 be defined by
Evidently P 0 is lower semi-continuous, and since P i is lower semi-continuous for each i ∈ I, so is P i for each i ∈ I as may readily be seen.
Next, for each i ∈ I, and each integer k > 0, let a correspondence A k i : X → 2 X i be defined by
Then each A k i is non-empty valued because w i ∈ X i for each i ∈ I. Also, each A k i is convex valued, has a relatively open graph in X × X i , and the correspondences A
, are upper semi-continuous. 10 Finally, for each integer k > 0, define a correspondence A k 0 : X → 2 X 0 by
Clearly, for each k, A k 0 is non-empty and convex valued, has a relatively open graph in X × X 0 , and is upper semi-continuous. Observe also that for each
For each integer k > 0 consider the abstract economy Γ k = ( X i , A k i , P i ) i∈I . By the remarks above, each Γ k satisfied the hypotheses of Lemma 1. Thus each Γ k has a quasi-equilibrium, i.e. there is a (p k , x k ) ∈ X such that
and such that for each i ∈ I,
Since w i ∈ X i for each i ∈ I, (1c) implies in particular that w i / ∈ P i (p k , x k ) for each i ∈ I. Hence, by the construction of P i , since w i ∈ int K as noted above,
The set X is compact. Therefore, letting k → ∞ and passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that there is a (p * , x * ) ∈ X such that p k → p * and x k i → x * i for each i ∈ I. Then from (1),
and, since P i is lower semi-continuous for each i ∈ I,
has relatively open lower sections. That is, the allocation (x * i ) i∈I is individually rational. Pick any j ∈ I. By what has been remarked at the beginning of this proof, the fact that the allocation (x * i ) i∈I is both feasible and individually rational implies that x * j ∈ c P j (x * j ). Also, again since (x * i ) i∈I is feasible, we must have x * j ∈ int K by choice of K. Thus x * j ∈ c ( P j (x * j ) ∩ int K). By definition of P j , this means x * j ∈ c P j (p * , x * ). Hence, by (3b) and (3c), p * x * j = p * w j + 1 − p * . Since this holds for every i ∈ I, it follows that p * = 1 by feasibility of (x * i ) i∈I . Now pick any i ∈ I and suppose
for all sufficiently small real numbers α > 0. Therefore (3b) and (3c), together with the fact that p * = 1, imply that p * x i ≥ p * w i . This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1
We start with some preliminary construction. Let H = i∈I H i and let G be a maximal family of elements of H such that the indicator functions 1 S ∈ R Ω , S ∈ G, are linearly independent. In particular, then, since H and hence G is finite, we have:
There is a real number k > 0 such that if α S , S ∈ G, are real numbers and | S∈G α S 1 S (s)| ≤ 1 for each s ∈ Ω then |α S | ≤ k for all S ∈ G.
(4)
Now for each S ∈ G, let L S = {e1 S : e ∈ E}. Then L S is a closed linear subspace of E Ω for each S ∈ G (recall that the topology of E, and hence that of E Ω , is Hausdorff by hypothesis). We claim that X i ⊂ S∈G L S for each i ∈ I. To see this, note that by our definition of an economy, each consumption set X i can be written as X i = { S∈H i e S 1 S : e S ∈ E + }. Thus it is enough to show that for any S ∈ H and any e ∈ E, e1 S ∈ S∈G L S . Now by choice of G, given S ∈ H we have 1 S = S∈G α S 1 S for some numbers α S , whence e1 S = S∈G α S e1 S for any given e ∈ E, and thus e1 S ∈ S∈G L S .
For the following let k be a number chosen according to (4) . We claim:
Given any closed, convex, and balanced neighborhood W of 0 in E, if
Indeed, suppose the conditions in (5) . Thus x = S∈G e S 1 S for points and hence from (4), |pe S | ≤ k for each S ∈ G. Consequently e S ∈ kW for each S ∈ G by the bipolar theorem, whence e S 1 S ∈ kW Ω for each S ∈ G. Thus (5) holds. (Note that (5) implies that the sum S∈G L S is direct.)
Let w = i∈I w i stand for the aggregate endowment and consider the order interval [0, w] = {x ∈ E Ω : 0 ≤ x ≤ w}. Note that [0, w] is the product of the order intervals [0, w(s)] in E. Thus, by (A5), [0, w] is η Ω -compact. (The topology η Ω was defined prior to the statement of (A5)). Clearly, if (x i ) i∈I is any feasible allocation then x i ∈ [0, w] for each i, and it follows that for each i ∈ I the set of all the x i that belong to some feasible allocation is η Ω -compact. Again by (A5), for each i ∈ I the preference relation P i has (relatively) η Ω -open lower sections. Consequently, for each i ∈ I the set of all the x i that belong to some feasible and individually rational allocation is η Ω -compact, too. By (A3) and the fact that the P i 's have (relatively) η Ω -open lower sections, it follows that we can select a finite set A ⊂ i∈I X i such that given any feasible and individually rational allocation (x i ) i∈I there is, for each i ∈ I, a point x i ∈ A with x i ∈ P i (x i ).
Let F be the set of all finite dimensional linear subspaces F of E Ω such that
Then F is directed by inclusion and since X i ⊂ S∈G L S for each i ∈ I, we have that F is non-empty.
For each F ∈ F let E F be the economy obtained by letting, for each i ∈ I, the consumption set be X F i = X i ∩ F , the endowment be w F i = w i , and the preference relation P F i be given by P F i (x) = P i (x) ∩ F for x ∈ X F i . Then, identifying F with some R , each economy E F satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 2 (observe in particular that the X F i 's are closed in F because, as was noted before, the X i 's are closed in E Ω ) and thus each E F has an individually rational quasi-equilibrium. That is, for each F ∈ F we obtain an allocation (x F i ) i∈I and an element p F ∈ F * , with p F = 0, such that i∈I
As F is directed by inclusion, the family ((x F i ) i∈I , p F ) F ∈F is a net in (E Ω ) I × F ∈F F * . Since by (6a), x F i ∈ [0, w] for each i and all F , and since [0, w] is η Ω -compact, we can assume, passing to a subnet if necessary, that there is an allocation (x i ) i∈I such that x F i → x i in the topology η Ω for each i ∈ I. In particular, then, i∈I x i = i∈I w i by (6a), i.e. the allocation (x i ) i∈I is feasible. (Recall that η and hence η Ω are Hausdorff linear topologies.) Moreover, using the fact that by (A5), each P i has (relatively) η Ω -open lower sections, we see from (6d) that the allocation (x i ) i∈I is individually rational.
According to assumption (A3), then, for each i ∈ I we can select an x i ∈ X i such that x i ∈ P i (x i ). Since by (A5) the P i 's have (relatively) open upper sections, we may assume x i ∈ int E Ω + for each i. (Indeed, consider any i ∈ I. Pick any e ∈ int E + . Then the element y ∈ E Ω defined by y(s) = e for each s ∈ Ω belongs to int E Ω + and, being constant across the states, is H imeasurable, thus belonging to X i . Consequently, for all λ ∈ (0, 1) we have
Now since for each i ∈ I, x F i → x i in the topology η Ω and x i ∈ P i (x i ), a glance at assumption (A5) shows that there is an F 1 ∈ F and a neighborhood U of 0 in E Ω such that for each i ∈ I and each F with F ⊃ F 1 ,
whenever y ∈ U and x i + y ∈ X i . Because the x i 's belong to int E Ω + , we can specify U so as to have { x i } + U ⊂ E Ω + for each i ∈ I. Then, by definition of the consumption sets X i , we may rephrase the penultimate sentence by saying that for each i ∈ I and each F with F ⊃ F 1 , x i + y ∈ P i (x F i ) whenever y ∈ U and y is H i -measurable. Clearly, since Ω is finite, we may assume that U has the form U = W Ω for some closed convex balanced neighborhood W of 0 in E (by shrinking the set U if necessary). In particular, then, U is a closed convex balanced neighborhood of 0 in E Ω and we have {u} + U ⊂ E Ω + for some u ∈ E Ω + .
These properties of U imply that for each F ∈ F, F ∩ U is compact in F by the facts that F is finite dimensional and that E Ω + is closed and E Ω + ∩ −E Ω + = {0}. Thus, considering the elements p F obtained above, we may assume, by renormalizing if necessary, that for some z F ∈ F ∩ U , 1 = p F z F ≥ p F z for all z ∈ F ∩ U . Appealing to the Hahn-Banach theorem, we can (and do) extend each p F to an element of E Ω, * -denoted by p F as well-such that 1 ≥ p F z for all z ∈ U . Then by the Alaoglu-Bourbaki theorem we may assume, again passing to some subnet if necessary, that there is a p ∈ E Ω, * such that p F → p weak * in E Ω, * .
We claim that p = 0. To see this, let |G| denote the number of elements of G, let k be the real number from (5) , and consider the elements z F from the previous paragraph. Since z F ∈ U and p F z F = 1 for each F ∈ F, and since U = W Ω for some closed convex balanced neighborhood W of 0 in E, using (c) of the definition of F and (5) it follows that for each F ∈ F there are an S ∈ G and a y F ∈ L S ∩ F such that y F ∈ U and p F y F ≥ 1/(k|G|). Passing to another subnet if necessary, we can fix an S ∈ G such that y F ∈ L S for each F ∈ F. By construction, there is an i ∈ I such that every y ∈ L S is H imeasurable. 11 Thus, by reindexing the consumers if necessary, we may assume y F is H 1 -measurable for each F ∈ F. Then, from the penultimate paragraph, for each F ∈ F with F ⊃ F 1 , we have x 1 − y F ∈ P 1 (x F 1 ). For some F 2 ∈ F,
Since p F → p weak * in E Ω, * , it follows that p = 0, as predicted.
We claim that there is an i ∈ I such that py < pw i for some y ∈ X i . Indeed, if for some i ∈ I and y ∈ X i , py < 0 then it is clear that the claim holds because X i is a cone. Thus suppose that for each i ∈ I, py ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X i . If pw 1 > 0-where the index 1 refers to the same agent as above-then again the claim holds. Thus suppose pw 1 = 0. Consider the element x 1 ∈ X 1 from above. Since pw 1 = 0, the argument from the previous paragraph implies that p x 1 > 0. Let (x i ) i∈I be a feasible allocation chosen according to (A6). Then, by (A7), x 1 ∈ int E Ω + and hence x 1 − λ x 1 ≥ 0 for λ > 0 but small enough. Thus, for such λ, x 1 − λ x 1 ∈ X 1 (since both x 1 and x 1 are F 1 -measurable) and hence p(x 1 − λ x 1 ) ≥ 0. Consequently px 1 > 0 because p x 1 > 0. Since (x i ) i∈I is feasible, it follows that p i∈I w i > 0 and hence that pw i > 0 for some i ∈ I, which establishes the claim.
Pick any i ∈ I and suppose y ∈ X i satisfies y ∈ P i (x i ).
In particular, then, we must have px i = pw i for each i ∈ I. Indeed, as noted already, there is an i ∈ I with pz < pw i for some z ∈ X i . But for such an i, "py ≥ pw i for all y ∈ P i (x i )" implies that, in fact, py > pw i for all y ∈ P i (x i ), since consumption sets are convex and preferences have open upper sections. It follows that the allocation (x i ) i∈I is Pareto optimal. Now since the allocation (x i ) i∈I is both individually rational and Pareto optimal, assumption (A4) and the fact that, for each i ∈ I, py ≥ pw i whenever y ∈ P i (x i ) combine to imply that px i ≥ pw i for each i ∈ I, whence px i = pw i for each i ∈ I by the feasibility of the allocation (x i ) i∈I . We conclude that ((x i ) i∈I , p) is a non-trivial and individually rational quasi-equilibrium, and thus the theorem is proved.
Lemmata for the proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 3. Let Y be a real locally convex Hausdorff space and let U and V be convex subsets of Y with U open and such that U ∩ V = ∅. Let y ∈ V ∩ c U , let q be a (not necessarily continuous) linear functional on Y and suppose qy ≤ qy for all y ∈ U ∩ V . Then there exist linear functionals q 1 and q 2 on Y such that q 1 is continuous, q 1 y ≤ q 1 u for all u ∈ U , q 2 y ≤ q 2 v for all v ∈ V , and q 1 + q 2 = q.
For a proof see that of Lemma 2 in [21] .
In the proofs of the next lemmata, we follow the convention that the sum of indexed vectors over an empty index set is zero. . . , f m and g 1 , . . . , g n be non-negative measurable real-valued functions on T . For each k ∈ K, let U k be a non-empty subset of U and V k be a non-empty subset of V . Suppose the following conditions to hold:
There are real numbers b and c and, for each = 1, 2, . . . , a measurable subset C of T with µ(C ) > 0 such that:
Then, given real numbers r > 0 and > 0, there are non-negative measurable real-valued functions f 1 , . . . , f m and g 1 , . . . , g n on T and a measurable subset D of T , with D ⊂ ∞ =1 C and µ(D) > 0, such that:
Proof. Set C = ∞ =1 C , let G be the set of all subsets of K, and let r > 0 be a real number. For each G ∈ G let
Then each C G is a measurable set and we have C = G∈G C G . Thus since K and hence G is a finite set, at least one of the G's must have the property that µ(C G ∩ C ) > 0 for infinitely many (because µ(C ) > 0 for each ). Choose and fix any element of G with this property, say K, and let (C j ) be the subsequence of the sequence (C ) such that µ(C K ∩ C j ) > 0 holds for each j = 1, 2, . . . . Set D j = C K ∩ C j for each j and set D = ∞ j=1 D j . Thus,
and, from (iiib), for each j, µ(D j ) > 0 and g i (t) ≥ j for all t ∈ D j and each i ∈ V . (8) For each j = 1, 2, . . . , pick a point t j ∈ D j and set α j = m i=1 f i (t j ). Observe that by (8) and condition (iiia), α j → ∞ as j → ∞. In particular, α j > 0 for all sufficiently large j. Thus we may as well assume that α j > 0 holds for all j. Set α j i = (1/α j )f i (t j ) for each i ∈ U and β j i = (1/α j )g i (t j ) for each i ∈ V . Note that, for the number b from condition (iii), we have
Also, we have 0 ≤ α j i ≤ 1 for each j and each i ∈ U . That is, for each i ∈ U the sequence (α j i )) j=1,2,... is bounded. But therefore, by (9) and condition (ii), the sequences (β j i )) j=1,2,... are also bounded since all the β j i are non-negative and since α j → ∞. Thus (passing to subsequences and relabeling if necessary) we may assume that all these sequences of real numbers are convergent, say α j i → α i for each i ∈ U and β j i → β i for each i ∈ V . Then α i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ U and β i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ V , and since m i=1 α j i = 1 for each j by construction, we must have α i > 0 for some i ∈ U . Moreover, since α j → ∞, a glance at (9) shows that
Let γ > 0 be any real number, and consider the measurable functions γα i 1 D , i ∈ U , and γβ i 1 D , i ∈ V . Then from (10),
Hence, setting f i = f i − γα i 1 D for each i ∈ U and g i = g i − γβ i 1 D for each i ∈ V , we obtain measurable functions on T such that
for all t ∈ T and all k ∈ K K.
Then the functions f i and g i satisfy (III) and, by (7), (V) of the required properties. Also, (I) and (II) hold since all the numbers α i and β i are nonnegative and since, as noted above, α i > 0 for some i ∈ U and µ(D) > 0. Furthermore, if γ > 0 is chosen small enough, then by conditions (iiib) and (iiic) of the lemma, all these functions are non-negative. Finally, given any > 0, then again by choosing γ > 0 sufficiently small we can guarantee that (IV) is satisfied, too.
Lemma 5. Let (T, T , µ) be a probability space, let f 1 , . . . , f n and g 1 , . . . , g n be non-negative measurable real-valued functions on T , let K be a non-empty finite set, and fore each k ∈ K let S k be a non-empty subset of {1, . . . , n}. Suppose the following conditions hold:
There is no real number α > 0 such that for all i = 1, . . . , n, g i (t) ≤ α for almost all t ∈ T .
Then there are non-negative measurable real-valued functions f 1 , . . . , f n and g 1 , . . . , g n on T such that:
(a) f i ≤ f i and g i ≤ g i for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Set I = {1, . . . , n} and let V be a maximal subset of I such that there is no real number α > 0 for which inf{g i (t) : i ∈ V } ≤ α for almost all t ∈ T (where "maximal" is meant with respect to the number of elements). By condition (iv) of the lemma, V is non-empty. Moreover, by the choice of V , we can find an integer > 0 and measurable subsets A of T with µ(A ) > 0, = 1, 2, . . . , such that for each i ∈ V and each , g i (t) ≥ for all t ∈ A but
A , let F be the set of all subsets of I, and for each F ∈ F let
Then each A F is a measurable set and we have A = F ∈F A F . Thus since I and therefore F is a finite set, at least one of the F 's must have the property that µ(A F ∩A ) > 0 for infinitely many . Choose and fix any element of F with this property, say W , and let (A j ) be the subsequence of the sequence (A ) such that µ(A W ∩ A j ) > 0 holds for each j = 1, 2, . . . . For simplicity of notation, we denote this subsequence again by (A ). Set C = A ∩ A W for each , and C = ∞ =1 C .
Summarizing, we have subsets V and W of I = {1, . . . , n}, with V non-empty, a measurable subset C of T , and a real number > 0 such that:
C where for each , C ∈ T with µ(C ) > 0 and g i (t) ≥ for all t ∈ C and each i ∈ V .
(11a)
Then by condition (i) of the lemma, K is non-empty (since V is non-empty) and we have k∈K (S k ∩ V ) = V . From (11a), (11c), and (iii) of the lemma, if k ∈ K then S k ∩ W = ∅. Hence, U is non-empty, too. Note for later reference that U ⊂ W . Now according to condition (iii) of the lemma, for each k ∈ K and all t ∈ T i∈S k
because all the functions involved are non-negative. By (11c), then, for each k ∈ K (in particular for each k ∈ K) and all t ∈ C,
In view of this, (11a), and the first part of (11c) together with the fact that U ⊂ W , we may now appeal to Lemma 4, with K there replaced by K, U k by S k ∩W , V k by S k ∩V , and with = 1/n and r = n +2, to obtain a measurable set D ⊂ C, with µ(D) > 0, and non-negative measurable functions f i : T → R, i ∈ U , and g i : T → R, i ∈ V , such that (I) to (V) of that lemma hold (with K in place of K, S k ∩ W in place of U k , and S k ∩ V in place of V k ).
Set f i = f i for i ∈ I U and g i = g i for i ∈ I V . Then, by (I) to (III) of Lemma 4, the functions f i and g i , i ∈ I, evidently satisfy (a) and (b) of the properties required in the lemma just under proof. Note that for each k ∈ K and each t ∈ T , we may write
But from this it is plain that (c) must hold because we have f i (t) ≤ f i (t) for each i ∈ I, and because if k ∈ K, i.e. S k ∩ V = ∅, then according to (V) of Lemma 4 12
for all t ∈ T . Now as for (d) of the required properties, by (III) of Lemma 4 we have only to check that, for each k ∈ K, if t is any point of D, then
Thus pick any t ∈ D. Clearly, if k / ∈ K, i.e. S k ∩ V = ∅, and if in addition S k ∩ U = ∅, then (12) holds because in this case f i = f i as well as g i = g i for all i ∈ S k . Suppose S k ∩ V = ∅ but S k ∩ U = ∅. Then from (11b) and (11c)
recalling that D ⊂ C, that U ⊂ W , and that f i (t) ≥ 0 for all i. On the other hand, from (IV) of Lemma 4, since has been specified as = 1/n,
Thus (12) holds. Now suppose k ∈ K. Recall that we have specified the number r from Lemma 4 as
and therefore, because g i = g i for i ∈ I V and because I W ⊂ I U and
Hence (12) holds again. Suppose i∈S k ∩W f i (t) − i∈S k ∩V g i (t) > n + 2. As noted above, we have i∈S k f i (t) ≥ i∈S k f i (t) − 1. Consequently, using the facts that g i ≤ g i for all i and that all the f i 's are non-negative, we have
the last inequality following from (11b) (and since t ∈ D ⊂ C). Thus (12) follows in this latter case, too. Thus we have shown that also (d) holds for the functions f i and g i , i ∈ I. This completes the proof of the lemma. Lemma 6. Let (T, T , µ) be a probability space, let J and K be non-empty finite sets, let (S k ) k∈K be a family of non-empty subset of J, and let g j ∈ L 1 (µ) for each j ∈ J. Suppose that j∈S k g j ≥ −1 T for each k ∈ K and that k∈K S k = J. Then there are an h j ∈ L 1 (µ) for each j ∈ J and a real number α > 0 such that
Proof. We regard L 1 (µ) as endowed with the usual norm · 1 ; thus L 1 (µ) is a Banach lattice. Set X = (L 1 (µ) × L 1 (µ)) J . We regard X as endowed with the product ordering ≥ J given by (a j , b j ) j∈J ≥ J (a j , b j ) j∈J if and only if for each j ∈ J, a j ≥ a j and b j ≥ b j in L 1 (µ). Also, X is regarded as endowed with the product norm · J given by (a j , b j ) j∈J J = j∈J ( a j 1 + b j 1 ). Thus X is a Banach lattice. Recall that the Banach lattice L 1 (µ) is order continuous and, in particular, Dedekind complete. Hence the same is true of X. Now let G be the subset of L 1 (µ) J given by G = (h j ) j∈J ∈ L 1 (µ) J : (ii) and (iii) of the lemma hold relative to the given family (g j ) j∈J ∈ L 1 (µ) J and j∈S k h j ≥ −1 T for each k ∈ K and let H be the subset of X given by
Then G is non-empty; e.g. the given family (g j ) j∈J belongs to this set. Hence, H is non-empty also. Let C be a non-empty chain in H for the ordering ≥ J . Note that C is bounded from below by the zero element of X. Hence since X is Dedekind complete, C has an infimum in X + , say (a j , b j ) j∈J . Evidently, we have a j ∧ b j = 0 for each j. Now since C, being a chain, is in particular downwards directed, and since X is order continuous, there is a sequence ((h + j,n , h − j,n ) j∈J ) n=1,2,... in C that converges to (a j , b j ) j∈J in the norm · J of X. In particular, then, h + j,n − h − j,n → a j − b j for each j in the norm of L 1 (µ). By continuity of addition and of the lattice operations in L 1 (µ), it follows that (a j − b j ) j∈J ∈ G and hence, since a j ∧ b j = 0 for each j, that (a j , b j ) j∈J ∈ H. Thus, every chain for ≥ J in H has a lower bound in H for ≥ J . By Zorn's Lemma, H has a minimal element for ≥ J . A glance at Lemma 5 shows that if (h + j , h − j ) j∈J is such a minimal element of H, then for some real number α > 0, (i) of the lemma must hold for the element (h j ) j∈J of G.
Indeed, let (h j ) j∈J be an element of G for which there is no real number α > 0 such that h j ≥ −α1 T for each j ∈ J. For each j, choose a versioṅ h + j of h + j and a versionḣ − j of h − j . Then for almost all t ∈ T ,ḣ + j (t) anḋ h − j (t) are ≥ 0 andḣ + j (t) ∧ḣ − j (t) = 0 for each j ∈ J, and for each k ∈ K, j∈S k (ḣ + j (t) −ḣ − j (t)) ≥ −1. Modifying the functionsḣ + j andḣ − j on a null set if necessary, we can assume that for each k ∈ K, j∈S k (ḣ + j (t) −ḣ − j (t)) ≥ −1 holds actually for all t ∈ T . In the same way, we can assume that the other properties hold for all t ∈ T . Then j∈S k (ḣ + j −ḣ − j ) ≥ −1 T for each k ∈ K, h + j ∧ḣ − j = 0 for each j ∈ J, and all the functionsḣ + j andḣ − j are non-negative. Also, it is clear that the condition "there is no real number α > 0 such that h j ≥ −α1 T for each j ∈ J" means that there is no real number α > 0 such that for all j ∈ J,ḣ − j (t) ≤ α for almost all t ∈ T . Finally, recall that we have k∈K S k = J by hypothesis. Consequently, writing J = {1, . . . , n}, we may apply Lemma 5 withḣ + j in place of f j andḣ − j in place of g j , j = 1, . . . , n, to find measurable functionsȧ j : T → R + andḃ j : T → R + , j ∈ J ≡ {1, . . . , n}, such that the following properties hold:
For some j there is a D ∈ T with µ(D) > 0 such thaṫ
For each j ∈ J let a j and b j be the elements of L 1 (µ) determined byȧ j andḃ j , respectively. In particular, we have a j ≥ 0 and b j ≥ 0 for each j ∈ J. From (13c) combined with the fact that (h j ) j∈J ∈ G we see that j∈S k (a j − b j ) ≤ j∈S k g j for each k ∈ K, and combining (13d) with the fact that (h j ) j∈J ∈ G we see that
Thus, the family (a j − b j ) j∈J is an element of G. Now from (13a) and the fact that h + j ∧ h − j = 0 for each j, it follows that a j ∧ b j = 0 for each j, and hence that the family (a j , b j ) j∈J is an element of H (since a j and b j are ≥ 0 for each j ∈ J). But (13a) and (13b) together imply that
Lemma 7. Let Z be a Riesz space and let Y be an ideal in Z. Let z 1 , . . . , z n be elements of Z and let y 1 , . . . , y n be elements of Y . Suppose that n i=1 y i ≤ n i=1 z i and that there is a y ∈ Y such that y ≤ z i for each i = 1, . . . , n. Then there are elements x 1 , . . . , x n of Y such that n i=1 x i = n i=1 y i and x i ≤ z i for each i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Let a = y ∧ y 1 ∧ y 2 ∧ · · · ∧ y n . For each i = 1, . . . , n, set a i = y i − a and b i = z i − a. Then for each i, a i ≥ 0 as well as
Now since y and all the y i belong to Y and Y is an ideal in Z, we have a ∈ Y and therefore also a i ∈ Y for each i, and thus n i=1 a i ∈ Y , too. Hence, c i ∈ Y for each i by the facts that 0 ≤ c i ≤ n i=1 a i and Y is in ideal in Z. We conclude that x i ∈ Y for each i.
Proof of Theorem 2 13
Let e ∈ E + be chosen according to assumption (A9). We first claim that there is no loss of generality in assuming that E = L(e). Indeed, let F denote L(e) endowed with the ordering and the topology induced from E; thus F is a locally convex-solid Riesz space. Note that the corresponding product topology on F Ω agrees with the topology induced from E Ω . Note also that by choice of e, we have L( i∈I w i (s)) = F for each s ∈ Ω. In particular, for each i ∈ I the endowment w i belongs to F Ω . Let E F be the restriction of the economy E to F Ω .
Suppose ((x i ) i∈I , p) is a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium for the economy E F . In particular, p ∈ F Ω, * . Let q be an extension of p to an element of E Ω, * . Now by (A10), F is dense in E and thus by continuity of the lattice operations in E, F + is dense in E + . By definition of the consumption sets X i , this implies that for each i, X i ∩ F Ω + is dense in X i . By continuity of preferences in E (assumption (A5)), it follows that ((x i ) i∈I , q) is a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium for E.
Next observe that the economy E F satisfies all the assumptions hypothesized for E in the statement of Theorem 2. Indeed, this is clear for (A1), (A2), (A5), (A9) and (A10). In fact, i∈I w i (s) is an order unit of F for each s ∈ Ω, so (A10) becomes redundant for E F . Further, since X i ⊂ E Ω + for each i ∈ I, and hence every feasible allocation for E is also a feasible allocation for E F , (A6) must hold for E F . For the same reason, every Pareto optimal and individually rational allocation for E F also has these properties when regarded as an allocation for E. Consequently, (A8) holds for E F because, as noted above, X i ∩ F Ω + is dense in X i for each i ∈ I. But this latter fact also implies that for each i ∈ I and x ∈ X i , P i (x) ∩ X i ∩ F Ω + is dense in P i (x), because by (A5), P i (x) is (relatively) open in X i . Consequently, (A3) and (A4) hold for E F , too.
Thus, as claimed, we can assume in the sequel that E = L(e). Note that this in particular means that E = L( i∈I w i (s)) for each s ∈ Ω (by the choice of e).
Now since E is a Hausdorff locally convex-solid Riesz space, the positive cone E + is closed in E and hence the formula z e = inf{λ ∈ R + : − λe ≤ z ≤ λe} defines an order unit norm · e on E ≡ L(e), for which the closed unit ball is
In particular, e ∈ · e -int E + and E + is · e -closed in E.
In the sequel, we write τ for the original topology of E. The expression (E, τ ) means E regarded as endowed with the topology τ , while (E, · e ) means E regarded as endowed with the topology given by the norm · e . Further, τ Ω denotes the product topology on E Ω corresponding to τ .
Observe that Theorem 1 applies to the economy E with respect to (E, · e ). Indeed, since (E, τ ) is locally convex-solid, [−e, e] is τ -bounded and therefore the topology given by the norm · e is stronger than the topology τ . Hence, assumption (A5) continues to hold for E when the original topology τ Ω of E Ω is replaced by the product topology corresponding to · e . Further, as noted above, we have E = L( i∈I w i (s)) for each s ∈ Ω, i.e. i∈I w i (s) is an order unit of E for each s ∈ Ω. This implies that (A7) holds for E with respect to (E, · e ). Finally, observe that (A4) for the original topology of E Ω and (A8) combine to imply that (A4) also holds when the original topology τ Ω of E Ω is replaced by the product topology corresponding to · e . (To see this, recall the fact that if C is a convex set in a topological vector space Z and x, y are points in Z with x ∈ c C and y ∈ int C, then (1−α)x+αy ∈ C for 0 < α ≤ 1, which implies that x belongs to the closure of C for any linear topology on Z.) Thus (since (A1) to (A3) and (A6) do not refer to any topology) we may apply Theorem 1 to find a feasible and individually rational allocation (x i ) i∈I together with an f ∈ (E, · e ) Ω, * such that ((x i ) i∈I , f ) is a non-trivial quasiequilibrium, modulo that f need not be continuous for the original topology τ Ω of E Ω . We are going to show that there is a p ∈ (E, τ ) Ω, * such that the conditions for a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium continue to hold for ((x i ) i∈I , p). 14 In the sequel, if g is a linear functional on E Ω such that, except τ Ω -continuity, all conditions of a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium are satisfied for ((x i ) i∈I , g), we will speak of ((x i ) i∈I , g) as a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium for simplicity, even though this is not quite in conformity with our definition. Now because the quasi-equilibrium ((x i ) i∈I , f ) is non-trivial (and since consumption sets are convex and preferences have open upper sections) there is an i ∈ I for which y ∈ P i (x i ) actually implies f y > f w i . Consequently the allocation (x i ) i∈I is Pareto optimal. Also, by construction, this allocation is individually rational. Thus according to assumption (A4), we have x i ∈ τ Ωc P i (x i ) for each i ∈ I. Moreover, by (A8), for each i ∈ I there is a convex and τ Ω -open subset A i of E Ω such that ∅ = A i ∩ X i ⊂ P i (x i ) and such that τ Ω -c P i (x i ) ⊂ τ Ω -c A i (where we have used the facts that for a convex set C in a topological vector space, int C is convex and, if int C = ∅, then c C = c (int C)). Then by the quasi-equilibrium conditions with respect to ((x i ) i∈I , f ), for each i ∈ I we must have f x i ≤ f y for all y ∈ A i ∩ X i (because f x i = f w i by the budget conditions and the feasibility of (x i ) i∈I ). Note also from above that x i ∈ τ Ω -c A i for each i ∈ I.
In view of these facts and since for each i ∈ I, X i is convex (and x i ∈ X i ), we may appeal to Lemma 3 to select, for each i ∈ I, a p i ∈ (E, τ ) Ω, * and a linear functional t i on E Ω such that f = p i + t i , p i x i ≤ p i y for all y ∈ A i , and t i x i ≤ t i y for all y ∈ X i . Since τ Ω -c P i (x i ) ⊂ τ Ω -c A i and p i is τ Ω -continuous, it follows that for each i ∈ I, p i x i ≤ p i y for all y ∈ P i (x i ), and since X i is a cone, we must have t i x i = 0 and t i y ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X i , whence p i x i = f x i and p i y ≤ f y for all y ∈ X i . In particular, p i w i ≤ f w i because w i ∈ X i .
We claim:
If g is a linear functional on E Ω such that for each i ∈ I, (i) gy ≤ f y for all y ∈ X i but (ii) gy ≥ p i y for all y ∈ X i , then ((x i ) i∈I , g) is again a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium.
Indeed, let g satisfy the conditions in (14) , pick any i ∈ I, and let y ∈ P i (x i ). Then from above, and by the hypothesis that w i ∈ X i ,
as well as gx i ≥ p i x i ≥ gw i . Thus for each i ∈ I, gx i ≥ gw i and if y ∈ P i (x i ) then gy ≥ gw i . By feasibility of (x i ) i∈I it follows that gx i = gw i for each i ∈ I. Thus ((x i ) i∈I , g) is a quasi-equilibrium. As for non-triviality, if there is an i ∈ I such that gy < 0 for some y ∈ X i then ((x i ) i∈I , g) is non-trivial, because X i is a cone. Suppose the other case, i.e. that for each i ∈ I, gy ≥ 0 for all y ∈ X i . Then from (14i), for each i ∈ I and all y ∈ X i , f y ≥ 0 as well. But this implies that f w i > 0 for some i ∈ I because the quasi-equilibrium ((x i ) i∈I , f ) is non-trivial. From above, gw i = gx i ≥ p i x i = f w i and it follows that ((x i ) i∈I , g) is non-trivial, too. Now since Ω is finite, (E, · e ) Ω, * can be identified with ((E, · e ) * ) Ω and (E, τ ) Ω, * can be identified with ((E, τ ) * ) Ω (where g ∈ (E, · e ) Ω, * corresponds to g ∈ ((E, · e ) * ) Ω if and only if gx = s∈Ω g (s)x(s) for all x ∈ E Ω ; similarly for (E, τ ) Ω, * ). Thus, by the definition of the consumption sets X i , the facts that for each i ∈ I, f y ≥ p i y for all y ∈ X i and f x i = p i x i can be rephrased to state 
(To see this, recall from the definition of the consumption sets X i that x ∈ X i if and only if x can be written in the form x = S∈H i e S 1 S with e S ∈ E + for each s ∈ Ω.) Moreover, from (14):
Recall that by construction, (E, · e ) is a normed Riesz space such that · e is an order unit norm. Thus, according to a standard fact, (E, · e ) * agrees with the order dual of E. In particular, (E, τ ) * is an ideal in (E, · e ) * because (E, τ ) is a locally convex-solid Riesz space. (Here and in the following, (E, · e ) * is regarded as endowed with the dual ordering relative to the ordering of E.)
Fix a q ∈ (E, τ ) * , with q ≥ 0 and q = 0, such that −q ≤ s∈S p i (s) ≤ q for each S ∈ H i and each i ∈ I. (This can be done since (E, τ ) * is a lattice.) Let B q be the band in (E, · e ) * generated by q and let B d q be the disjoint complement of B q in (E, · e ) * , i.e.
Since the order dual of any Riesz space is Dedekind complete, B q is in fact a projection band, i.e. we have (E, · e ) * = B q ⊕B 
In particular, by choice of q, s∈S g(s) ≥ −q for each S ∈ H i and each i ∈ I.
Now since (E, · e ) is a normed Riesz space with an order unit norm, its dual space (E, · e ) * , with the dual norm and ordering, is actually an L-space, and hence so is the band B q . Thus, having q as a weak unit, B q is order isomorphic to L 1 (µ) on some probability space (T, T , µ) such that q becomes identified with 1 T . Therefore by Lemma 6, since g(s) ∈ B q for each s ∈ Ω, (20) implies that we may find an h ∈ ((E, · e ) * ) Ω and a real number α > 0 such that h(s) ≥ −αq for each s ∈ Ω; 
(Note: the set J from Lemma 6 corresponds to Ω, and the family (S k ) k∈K of that lemma to i∈I H i .)
From (21b) and (18) we see that s∈S h(s) ≤ s∈S f (s) for each S ∈ H i and each i ∈ I, and combining (21c) with (19) and the fact that s∈S p i (s) ≤ q for each S ∈ H i and each i ∈ I, we see that s∈S h(s) ≥ s∈S p i (s) for each S ∈ H i and each i ∈ I. (Indeed, (19) and s∈S p i (s) ≤ q together imply that s∈S p i (s) ≤ ( s∈S g(s)) ∧ q, so (21c) yields s∈S p i (s) ≤ ( s∈S h(s)) ∧ q whence s∈S p i (s) ≤ s∈S h(s).) Thus, in view of (17), ((x i ) i∈I , h) is a nontrivial quasi-equilibrium. If we can show that h actually belongs to ((E, τ ) * ) Ω , i.e. is τ Ω -continuous, then we will have finished the proof.
To this end, recall that (E, τ ) * is an ideal in (E, · e ) * , that q ∈ (E, τ ) * , and that p i (s) ∈ (E, τ ) * for each i ∈ I and each s ∈ Ω. Consider any i ∈ I and any S ∈ H i . Since s∈S p i (s) ≤ s∈S h(s), and in view of (21a), we may appeal to Lemma 7 to find elements q i (s) ∈ (E, τ ) * , s ∈ S, so that s∈S q i (s) = s∈S p i (s) and q i (s) ≤ h(s) for each s ∈ S. We must have q i (s)x i (s) = h(s)x i (s) for each s ∈ S. Indeed, by definition of the consumption set X i there is an e ∈ E + such that x i (s) = e for each s ∈ S. Then q i (s)e ≤ h(s)e for each s ∈ S. On the other hand, using (16) This construction holds for each S ∈ H i and i ∈ I. That is, because H i is a partition of Ω for each i ∈ I, we have, for each s ∈ Ω, elements q i (s) ∈ (E, τ ) * such that for each i ∈ I, q i (s) ≤ h(s) as well as q i (s)x i (s) = h(s)x i (s).
Pick any s ∈ Ω and let q(s) be the supremum of {q i (s) : i ∈ I} in (E, · e ) * . (This is well defined because (E, · e ) * is equal to the order dual of E as was noted above.) Then q(s) ≤ h(s), and since (E, τ ) * is an ideal in (E, · e ) * , we have in fact q(s) ∈ (E, τ ) * . Using the Riesz-Kantorovich formula and the facts that i∈I x i (s) = i∈I w i (s) (feasibility) and i∈I w i (s) ∈ E + , we conclude q(s) Consequently q(s) i∈I w i (s) = h(s) i∈I w i (s) because q(s) ≤ h(s). Finally, recall from above that E = L( i∈I w i (s)). Therefore the facts that q(s) ≤ h(s) and q(s) i∈I w i (s) = h(s) i∈I w i (s) together imply that q(s) and h(s) agree. It follows that h ∈ ((E, τ ) * ) Ω and the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 3
With e chosen according to assumption (A9), let F denote the ideal L(e) with the ordering and the topology induced from E. In particular, then, F Ω is equal to L( i∈I w i ), the order ideal generated by the aggregate endowment i∈I w i . Let E F be the restriction of the economy E to F Ω . Noting that every feasible allocation for the economy E is also a feasible allocation for E F , it is readily seen that the economy E F satisfies all the assumptions of Theorem 2. Thus E F has a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium ((x i ) i∈I , f ); in particular f ∈ F Ω, * . Using the Hahn-Banach Theorem, let f be an extension of f to an element of E Ω, * . Thus for each i ∈ I, f x i = f w i and f y ≥ f w i for y ∈ P i (x i ) ∩ F Ω .
Note also that according to the proof of Theorem 2, the allocation (x i ) i∈I can be assumed to be Pareto optimal and individually rational for the economy E F , therefore also for the original economy E.
Consider any i ∈ I. By (A4'), x i ∈ c P i (x i ), and by (A8'), there is a convex and open subset A i of E Ω such that ∅ = A i ∩ X i ∩ F Ω ⊂ P i (x i ) ∩ F Ω and such that c P i (x i ) ⊂ c A i (using the facts that for a convex set C in a topological vector space, int C is convex and, if int C = ∅, then c C = c (int C)). Then x i ∈ c A i , and from (22), f x i ≤ f y for all y ∈ A i ∩X i ∩F Ω . Since x i ∈ X i ∩F Ω and X i ∩ F Ω is convex, we can now use Lemma 3 in a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 2 to find a p i ∈ E Ω, * such that p i x i = f x i , p i x i ≤ p i y for all y ∈ P i (x i ), and p i z ≤ f z for all z ∈ X i ∩ F Ω .
Consider the information partition H i of agent i and let π i : E Ω → E Ω be the linear operator given by
where |S| stands for the cardinality of the finite set S. Then π i is a positive projection from E Ω onto the subspace of E Ω consisting of the H i -measurable elements of E Ω . Thus, in particular, π i y = y for all y ∈ X i . Set
(where • means composition of mappings). Then q i ∈ E Ω, * since π i is linear and continuous. We claim that f x i = q i x i ≤ q i y for all y ∈ P i (x i ) and that q i z ≤ f z for all z ∈ F Ω + . Indeed, since π i y = y for y ∈ X i , we have q i y = p i y for y ∈ X i , which, by choice of p i , yields the first part of the claim. As for the second, it is evident that if z ∈ F Ω + then π i z ∈ F Ω + by definition of F , and thus, in fact, π i z ∈ F Ω ∩ X i because π i z is H i -measurable and X i is just the cone of positive H i -measurable elements of E Ω (by the definition of X i ). But p i z ≤ f z for all z ∈ F Ω ∩ X i by construction, and thus the second part of the claim follows.
Summing up, for each i ∈ I there is a q i ∈ E Ω, * such that q i x i ≤ q i y for all y ∈ P i (x i ) ;
(23a) q i x i = f x i ; and (23b) q i z ≤ f z for all z ∈ F Ω + .
(23c) Now, the topology of E Ω being locally convex-solid, E Ω, * is an ideal of the order dual of E Ω . Thus the set {q i : i ∈ I} has a supremum in the order dual of E Ω , say q, with q ∈ E Ω, * . Observe that q agrees with f on F Ω . Indeed, by (23c) and the Riesz-Kantorovich formula we have qz ≤ f z for z ∈ F Ω + because F Ω is an ideal in E Ω . Using (23b) and the facts that the allocation (x i ) i∈I is feasible, i.e. i∈I x i = i∈I w i , and that x i ≥ 0 for each i, another invocation of the Riesz-Kantorovich formula reveals that q i∈I w i ≥ f i∈I w i . (Cf. the argument at the end of the proof of Theorem 2.) But by construction, F Ω is equal to L( i∈I w i ), and it follows that q and f agree on F Ω , as predicted. Now by the facts that q ≥ q i and P i (x i ) ⊂ E Ω + for each i ∈ I, (23a) and (23b) imply that for each i ∈ I, qy ≥ f x i whenever y ∈ P i (x i ). But from this and the facts that ((x i ) i∈I , f ) is a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium for E F and that, on F Ω , q agrees with f and hence with f (by construction of f ) it is plain that ((x i ) i∈I , q) is a non-trivial quasi-equilibrium for E. This completes the proof of the theorem.
